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Abstract
The recent activity in pension buy-outs and bespoke longevity swaps suggests that
a significant process of aggregation of longevity exposures is under way, led by
major investment banks and buy-out firms with the support of leading reinsurers.
As regulatory capital charges and limited reinsurance capacity constrain the scope
for market growth, there is now an opportunity for institutions that are pooling
longevity exposures to issue securities that appeal to capital market investors,
thereby broadening the sharing of longevity risk and increasing market capacity.
For this to happen, longevity exposures need to be suitably pooled and tranched
to maximize diversification benefits offered to investors and to address asymmetric
information issues. We argue that a natural way for longevity risk to be transferred
is through suitably designed principal-at-risk bonds.
∗Biffis (E.Biffis@imperial.ac.uk) is at Imperial College Business School, Imperial College Lon-
don, South Kensington Campus, SW7 2AZ United Kingdom.
†Blake (D.Blake@city.ac.uk; corresponding author) is at the Pensions Institute, Cass Business
School, City University London, 106 Bunhill Row, EC1Y 8TZ United Kingdom.
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1 Introduction
The total amount of pension-related longevity risk exposure in private-sector corpora-
tions is globally estimated at $25 trillion.1 In 2006, a market started in the UK to
transfer longevity risk from the pension plans of UK corporations. From 2010, this mar-
ket became international, with transfers taking place in Holland, the US and Canada.
However, the total value of the transfers since the market started has been little more
than $100 billion, a small fraction of the total exposure. In addition, most of the trans-
fers have ended up with insurance and reinsurance companies.2 A small proportion
of the total has involved investment banks which have passed the risk exposure on to
capital markets investors. This rate of transfer to the capital markets needs to grow
signiﬁcantly, since there is insuﬃcient capital in the insurance and reinsurance industry
to absorb the total exposure. Furthermore, long-term capital markets investors need to
be persuaded to hold longevity risk exposure in a form in which they are comfortable
and with a suitable longevity risk premium which reﬂects the true level of risk they
are assuming. Long-term investors, such as sovereign wealth funds, endowments, family
oﬃces, should ﬁnd a longevity-linked asset an attractive one to hold in a diversiﬁed port-
folio, since its return will have low correlation with the returns on other asset classes,
such as ﬁnancial assets, real estate and commodities.
However, such investors are currently wary of longevity-linked assets. If experts in
longevity risk, such as insurance companies, are trying to sell this risk on to them, is
this just because they see this simply as an opportunity to gain some capital relief from
their regulator, a perfectly legitimate business practice? Or is it because they have
1The Life and Longevity Markets Association.
2The market was started by newly established monoline insurers known as buy-out companies.
Later, larger traditional insurance companies and reinsurance companies and investment banks entered
the market. See LCP (2012) for an overview of market participants and recent transactions.
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become aware that the risk is greater than they initially believed and are trying to
oﬄoad it on to unsuspecting investors before the true extent of the exposure becomes
more widely known? A relevant problem here is asymmetric information. One party to
the transaction knows more about what is being oﬀered for sale than the other party.
In the extreme case, the potential buyer in the transaction might be so suspicious of the
potential seller’s intention that they will not transact at any price: in this case, there
will be no market. For a market to exist in the presence of asymmetric information, the
potential seller needs to ﬁnd a way of communicating to the potential buyer the true
extent of the information that they have acquired about the item up for sale. In other
words, they have to provide an appropriate signal to the potential buyer that they are
not being sold a ‘lemon’.3
In this article, we outline how a market in longevity risk transfers may grow out of the
recent activity in pension liability transfers. Figure 1 provides a stylized representation
of the potential participants in such a market. There are some holders of longevity risk
exposures, which we may regard as ‘informed’. An example is a large pension plan which
has undertaken a longevity study of its members and beneﬁciaries, and therefore has
acquired private information about its own longevity exposure. There are then holders of
longevity exposures which (oversimplifying) we may regard as ‘uninformed’. An example
is a small pension plan which does not have the resources to undertake a longevity study
of its members. There are also informed intermediaries, such as insurance companies
and investment banks, which have conducted their own longevity studies of the members
of pension plans, but are considering selling on their acquired longevity risk exposure
either directly to investors or to intermediaries in insurance-linked securities (ILSs).
3A ‘lemon’ is something, such as a second-hand car, which is revealed to be faulty only after it has
been purchased (e.g., Akerlof, 1970).
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Finally, there are end investors (and other intermediaries), whom we may regard as
‘uninformed’, in the sense that they have not conducted any longevity studies of their
own, possibly because they do not have access to the plan data needed to conduct such a
study. They therefore have less information about the true extent of the longevity risk in
which they are being invited to invest than those selling it, a classic case of asymmetric
information. An eﬀective way of overcoming the problem of asymmetric information
for an informed seller is to disclose information about the relevant risk characteristics
of the exposures being transferred (e.g., gender, age, medical status, similar details on
potential beneﬁciaries of any survivor beneﬁts), and to signal their quality by retaining
part of the exposures. Another eﬀective tool is to structure the risk transfer vehicle so
as to minimize the sensitivity of the vehicle’s value to the issuer’s private information.
This would typically entail pooling and tranching the exposure, as we outline below.
Since the bulk of global longevity risk exposures is represented by the liabilities of
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, the market for pension buy-outs and longevity swaps
is an important origination market that could support the development of a market in
longevity-linked securities. In particular, buy-out ﬁrms act as aggregators of the pension
liabilities of small companies into larger pools, and are de facto the natural candidates
to intermediate the transfer of longevity exposures originating from the pension buy-out
market to capital market investors. Because of capital requirements, and the returns
that can be generated by deploying resources in the buy-out market, buy-out ﬁrms have
an incentive to securitize their exposures to diversify risk and free up capital. There is an
important role for regulators in this process, as they may provide incentives to disclose
and use detailed information from the very same internal models used to demonstrate
the capital resilience of (re)insurers and buy-out ﬁrms in the pension buy-out market.
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Figure 1: The participants in a market for longevity risk transfers.
2 Lessons learned so far, and the way forward
During the last decade, several attempts have been made to launch standardized longevity-
linked securities. The longevity bond designed by the European Investment Bank (EIB)
in 2004, and immediately withdrawn due to insuﬃcient demand, is probably the most
widely discussed example, due to the important lessons that can be learned from its
failure to launch. The EIB instrument was a 25-year bond with an issue price of £540m
and coupons linked to a cohort survivor index based on the realized mortality rates of
English and Welsh males aged 65 in 2002. The initial coupon was set equal to £50m,
while the subsequent coupons would have reduced in line with the realized mortality of
the reference cohort (see Blake et al., 2006, for additional details). Hence, the higher
the number of survivors in the population each year, the higher the coupons paid to
investors, meaning that the instrument should have been appealing to pension plans
and annuity providers. There are two main reasons why the EIB bond did not launch
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and we would like to discuss:4
• Design issues. As a hedging instrument, the EIB bond did not oﬀer suﬃcient
ﬂexibility. The hedge was bundled up within a bond, and provided no leverage
opportunities. The bond format meant that a considerable upfront payment was
required to access the longevity hedge component of the instrument, represented
by a longevity swap which paid the longevity-linked coupons. Furthermore, the
basis risk in the bond was considered to be too great: the bond’s mortality index
covered just a single cohort of 65-year-old males from the national population of
England and Wales, representing only a fraction of the average pension plan’s and
annuity provider’s exposure to longevity risk.5
• Transparency issues. The EIB bond’s projected cash ﬂows depended on projec-
tions of the future mortality of 65-year-old males from England & Wales prepared
by the UK Government Actuary’s Department (GAD). The forecasting model
used for the projections is not published, and the projections themselves are a
result of adjustments made to the baseline forecasts in response to expert opinion.
This represented a major barrier to investors and hedgers either not familiar with
longevity risk or with strong views on speciﬁc mortality projection models. On
the pricing side, the longevity risk premium built into the initial price of the EIB
bond was set at 20 basis points (Cairns et al., 2005): in the absence of agreement
on a baseline best estimate, investors had no real feeling as to how appropriate
this ﬁgure was.
4See Blake et al. (2006); Biffis and Blake (2010b); Blake et al. (2013) for further details.
5The typical longevity exposure of a pension plan spans different cohorts of active and retired
members, not to mention the fact that a large portion of pensions paid by pension funds and annuity
providers are indexed to inflation.
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In the wake of the EIB bond withdrawal, there has been considerable innovation
taking the form of longevity indices and mortality derivatives, for example. Despite
several attempts, so far standardized solutions have not been as successful as those
following the more traditional insurance paradigm, where the hedger is indemniﬁed
(fully hedged) against changes in longevity risk. Successful longevity risk transfers have
taken the form of pension buy-outs, pension buy-ins, and longevity swaps. Pension
buy-outs involve the transfer of a pension plan’s assets and liabilities to a regulated life
insurer. The transaction allows the employer to oﬀ-load the pension liabilities from its
balance sheet, or to replace pension assets and liabilities with a regular loan in case buy-
out costs are ﬁnanced by borrowing.6 In a pension buy-in, a bulk annuity contract is
purchased as a plan asset to match some or all of the pension plan’s liabilities, meaning
that interest rate, inﬂation, and longevity risk are all fully hedged, while the liabilities
remain in the pension plan. Longevity swaps allow a hedger to receive longevity-linked
payments (the ﬂoating leg) in exchange for a stream of ﬁxed payments (the ﬁxed leg).
The most popular transactions to date involve bespoke, or customized, swaps, where
the ﬂoating leg is linked to the speciﬁc mortality experience of the hedger. These forms
of longevity risk transfer have successfully addressed the design issues mentioned above,
by removing the basis risk originating from diﬀerences in the mortality experience of the
hedger and the evolution of a mortality index. Pension buy-outs and buy-ins still require
substantial upfront costs, which longevity swaps avoid. The latter have limited upfront
costs, mainly associated with set-up fees and initial margins in case of collateralization.7
6In the case of a plan deficit, a company borrows the amount necessary to pay an insurer to buy-out
its pension liabilities in full.
7See Biffis, Blake, Pitotti and Sun (2012) for details on the structuring of longevity swaps, including
collateral arrangements.
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The limited take-up of standardized hedges such as indexed longevity swaps is prob-
ably due to (perceived) diﬃculties in managing longevity basis risk within broader lia-
bility driven investment (LDI) strategies.8 There is no reason to believe, however, that
the success of standardized instruments should depend exclusively on the demand of
indexed hedges by pension plans and annuity providers. The huge capital inﬂows that
have recently targeted the reinsurance and the ILSs space, as well as the natural process
of aggregation of longevity exposures carried out by reinsurers and buy-out ﬁrms in the
pension buy-out market, suggest that customized hedges may well co-exist with stan-
dardized instruments appealing to capital market investors. It is reinsurers and buy-out
ﬁrms, rather than smaller pension plans and annuity providers, that are in a natural
position to originate instruments written on large pools of exposures and to identify
payoﬀ structures that may appeal to ILS investors. The next sections aim at giving an
idea of how the development of a ‘life market’ may come about through this channel.
3 The optimal level of securitization of longevity ex-
posures
Securitization,9 in general, involves the bundling together of a set of illiquid assets or
liabilities (in our case mainly the latter) with a similar set of risk exposures, and then the
sale of this bundled package to investors. The purpose of such a bundling exercise is to
reduce the idiosyncratic (or diversiﬁable) risk which is contained in each of the individual
assets or liabilities when they are considered in isolation, while leaving the systematic
(or non-diversiﬁable) risk to be borne by the investor. In our case, the idiosyncratic
8Longevity risk management in LDI is discussed, for example, in Aro and Pennanen (2013).
9See Cowley and Cummins (2005), for an overview of insurance securitization.
8
risk relates to the uncertainty surrounding the length of life of individual plan members,
while the systematic risk relates to the uncertainty surrounding the average length of
life of the members of the group taken as a whole. We call these two types of risk
idiosyncratic and systematic longevity risk, respectively. We would not expect investors
to be interested in holding idiosyncratic longevity risk, any more than they would be
interested in being exposed to the idiosyncratic risk from holding just a single company’s
shares or bonds in their investment portfolio. This is why longevity risk needs to be
pooled before securitization. However, investors would be willing to invest in a particular
asset class if they are appropriately rewarded for the true level of systematic longevity
risk that they are assuming. So for investors to become interested in buying into this
particular asset class, they need to have conﬁdence that the premium they are being
paid by buy-out ﬁrms, reinsurers, and pension plans reﬂects the true level of systematic
longevity risk underlying the transaction. A natural way for informed sellers to persuade
potential investors that this is the case is to retain some of the exposure themselves. If
the seller keeps some ‘skin in the game’, this provides an important as well as a credible
signal to investors, since longevity exposures are very capital intensive - in terms of both
regulatory and economic capital requirements - for the insurance companies operating
in longevity space. Investors will also realize that the larger the securitization fraction
(γ) - the proportion of the total exposure that the seller seeks to oﬄoad - the greater
the severity of the longevity risk exposure indicated by the seller’s own assessment of
longevity risk, and the lower the price the investor will oﬀer. Since investors will try
to neutralize the seller’s informational advantage through a downward sloping demand
curve for the longevity exposure transferred, the seller will try to securitize a fraction
of exposure that is optimal, in the sense that it minimizes the cost to the seller from
oﬄoading the risk exposure. If the chosen fraction is too low, an insuﬃcient amount
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of the longevity risk will be transferred to investors and the seller will have to bear
higher retention costs (in terms of higher capital requirements than desired). If the
fraction is too high, investors will demand too high a risk premium, thus reducing the
beneﬁts of capital relief from securitization. The seller thus faces two costs, retention
costs (from the capital requirements) and liquidity costs (from the downward sloping
demand curve), and will wish to minimize the sum of these costs.10
4 The optimal tranching of longevity exposures
How should the securitized longevity exposure be transferred to investors? The seller
of the exposure wants to transfer a liability, while the buyer of the exposure wants to
hold an asset. How can the sale of a liability by an informed holder or intermediary
become an asset to an uninformed investor? Further, we can assume that the investor
will not want to be responsible for making the pension payments once the securitization
transaction has taken place. To answer these questions, note that the holders of the
longevity exposure are really looking for a longevity risk hedge for a fraction (γ) of their
current holdings. The holders need to persuade the investors to provide that hedge in
exchange for receiving an appropriate longevity risk premium. When sellers are more
informed, a possible way to do this is for the holders of the longevity exposure to issue
a principal-at-risk bond which the investors will buy. The return on the bond will
incorporate a longevity risk premium11 in addition to the usual credit risk premium
associated with the issuer.12 By issuing such a bond, it is the pure longevity risk that is
10This situation is formalized in the model of DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), for example.
11In the model of Biffis and Blake (2010a), this premium is zero as both supply and demand are
risk-neutral.
12The bond would typically be collateralized and issued via a special purpose vehicle, a procedure
that would influence the size of the credit risk premium.
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transferred, not the exposure itself or the obligation to make the pension payments.13
The securitization of longevity risk is therefore diﬀerent from other forms of longevity
risk transfers (such as pension buy-outs) in which assets and liabilities are bundled up
and transferred in their entirety. Note that the bond-like structure discussed here is
not to be confused with capital intensive hedging instruments such as the EIB longevity
bond. What we have in mind is the format of catastrophe bonds,14 where the premiums
paid by investors to acquire longevity-linked notes are used to purchase securities that
are held in a special purpose vehicle and used as collateral for the bond’s payments.15
In particular, the principal-at-risk bond will repay the principal in full if the propor-
tion of the members from the population underlying the risk transfer who have survived
between the bond’s issue and maturity dates is below a preset level. However, if the
proportion who have survived (i.e., the survival rate) is higher than this preset level
(known as the point of attachment), the amount of principal returned to the investor
will be reduced according to some preset formula. If the survival rate exceeds another
preset level (known as the point of exhaustion), the investor gets no principal back. The
point of attachment will be determined to minimize the sensitivity of the bond’s value
to private information, and hence the cost to the holder of the exposure from issuing
the bond.16 Multiple attachment points can be used to meet the demand of investors
with diﬀerent risk preferences.
In ﬁnancial engineering terms, the principal-at-risk bond is a combination of a stan-
13Should the holder of the exposure wish to do so, this responsibility could be transferred to a third
party administrator who would make the pension payments.
14See Grace, Klein and Phillips (2001) and Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2012), for example.
15In the baseline model of Biffis and Blake (2010a), for example, one unit of collateral is used to col-
lateralize a representative survival probability, S. The resulting payoff from the instrument is therefore
a death rate D = 1− S.
16It is a central tenet of corporate finance that debt-like instruments can minimize the adverse effects
of information asymmetry when raising capital through the issuance of securities (e.g. Tirole, 2005).
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dard bond paying (say) 1 at maturity and a call option which has been sold by the
investors to the bond’s issuer (in the case of a single point of attachment). The option
will expire in-the-money if, on the bond’s maturity date, the survival rate from the refer-
ence population (S) exceeds the preset level (S∗). The principal repayment to investors
will be reduced in this case. The point of attachment is therefore the same as the strike
price of the option. The option will expire worthless if S is below S∗. We can therefore
write the formula for the repayment of principal as B = 1 − max(0, S − S∗), where
max(0, S − S∗) means the larger of 0 and (S − S∗) and is the formula for the value of
a call option on its expiry date. The seller of the bond therefore has an eﬀective hedge
against systematic longevity risk for survival rates S which lie above S∗, but bears all
the longevity risk below S∗.
Another way to think of this is that we have tranched the exposure at S∗ with the
current holder of the exposure bearing the longevity risk below S∗ and investors bearing
the longevity risk above S∗. The optimal tranching level will be the one that minimizes
the cost to the holder of transferring the exposure, as shown in Figure 2. If S∗ is set
too low, the longevity risk premium demanded by investors will be excessive and the
price that they will agree to pay for the bond will be too low. If S∗ is set too high,
the holder of the exposure bears too much of the longevity risk. A rough measure of
the ex-post cost of the hedge is B − P , the diﬀerence between the principal actually
repaid and the initial sale price of the bond. The bond issuer’s objective is to choose
the optimal tranching level (or, equivalently, the strike price or point of attachment) to
minimize the expected cost of the longevity hedge to the issuer.
A key issue to address is the choice of reference population that determines the
payments on the bond. So far, we have assumed that the bond issuer would prefer it if
the reference population were the same as its own population of pension plan members
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and annuitants. This would allow the bond issuer to establish a very eﬀective hedge
against its own exposure. But in a world of asymmetric information, investors who buy
the bond might not feel comfortable about this, since the bond issuer will be determining
the principal repayment in a manner which might be perceived to lack full transparency.
Investors, however, might be more comfortable if the reference population were the same
as the national population (or other publicly monitored population) since, in this case,
information on survival and mortality rates are published by the country’s independent
oﬃcial statistical agency. By doing this, asymmetric information issues are less of a
concern, but a new problem emerges: using a national population index to hedge the
longevity risk of a sub-group of the population introduces basis risk in the hedge. Basis
risk arises because the mortality experience of the national population might diﬀer
from the sub-group being hedged. In particular, we know that members of pension
plans tend to live longer than members of the population as a whole, so the national
index might involve underestimating the longevity risk of the pensioner sub-group being
hedged. While basis risk certainly exists, studies have shown that it can also be hedged
quite eﬀectively and so hedges and principal-at-risk bonds based on national indices can
provide very good, if not 100%, hedge eﬀectiveness (see, e.g., Coughlan et al., 2011).
Hedge eﬀectiveness can be further increased if exposures are pooled or aggregated.
5 Pooling or aggregating exposures
If multiple small exposures, such as those associated with a number of small pension
plans, are pooled or aggregated together,17 there might be further diversiﬁcation bene-
17buy-out and other insurance and reinsurance companies have already been acting as aggregators
and may find themselves as naturally positioned to take on this intermediary role.
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Figure 2: The optimal tranching level S∗.
ﬁts,18 although any informational advantage concerning the individual longevity trends
within the separate exposures will be destroyed.19 A principal-at-risk bond with n di-
versiﬁable exposures will have the following repayment value: B = 1−max(0, Sn−S
∗
n
),
where S∗
n
is the optimal tranching level (or, equivalently, strike price or point of attach-
ment) and Sn is the average exposure when there are a total of n exposures. Figure 3
shows the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts from pooling: the expected cost to the issuer of the
bond and the strike price are both lower compared with the case where the exposures
are tranched separately. Pooling and tranching are more valuable when the private
information on the severity of longevity risk aﬀects the entire pool rather than being
speciﬁc to each individual exposure. This would be the case when the survival rates
18See Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993), for example.
19See DeMarzo (2005), for example.
14
relate to diﬀerent cohorts of pension plan members, but the underlying characteristics
are similar, for example, they come from the same geographical area, social class, gender
or age grouping (e.g., men in their 70s). Pooling on the basis of such factors can reduce
the costs associated with asymmetric information.
Figure 3: Tranching with and without pooling.
6 Conclusions
We argue that a natural format for transferring longevity risk to end investors is a
principal-at-risk bond. The bond’s payments need to be structured in a way that deals
with the concerns that investors will have about the seller of the bond having more infor-
mation about the true level of longevity risk underlying the exposure than the investor
has. This problem of asymmetric information can be managed by suitably pooling and
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securitizing the exposures in tranches. To give comfort to the investor that they are not
being sold a ‘lemon’, the longevity risk hedger needs to keep some ‘skin in the game’, by
retaining some of the exposure. To minimize the cost of the hedge, the hedger should
only hedge the extreme longevity risk, that is, the longevity risk above a threshold level
which we have called the optimal tranching level (or, equivalently, strike price or point
of attachment). To further reduce the cost to the hedger, they should pool or aggregate
their longevity exposures as much as possible. This reduces the information advantage of
the seller about individual longevity trends, but it increases the degree of diversiﬁcation
and, in turn, might reduce the basis risk faced by hedger. Figure 4 shows the risk trans-
fers that might characterize the stylized longevity risk market discussed in this article.
Uninformed holders of longevity risk exposures, such as small pension plans, should pool
and transfer their full exposures to informed intermediaries, since transferring exposures
separately would expose them to ‘cherry picking’ from more informed counterparties.20
Informed holders, such as large pension plans, will retain the fraction (1 − γ∗
1
) of their
exposure and securitize the fraction γ∗
1
by transferring it to (less) informed intermedi-
aries. They could also deal directly with end investors by retaining a larger fraction
(1 − γ∗
2
) of their exposure and securitizing a smaller fraction γ∗
2
, possibly tranching it
at an optimal level S∗. Finally, informed intermediaries would deal with end investors
by pooling their (n say) exposures and tranching them at level S∗
n
.21 The issuance of
instruments linked to public longevity indices would side step asymmetric information
issues, but expose hedgers to basis risk. Even in this case, however, the principal-at-risk
20We note that Figures 1 and 4 encompass both cases of informed and uninformed sellers of longevity
exposures. In the first case, the investors face the ‘buyer’s curse’ (the risk of ending up with a ‘lemon’)
when buying from more informed counterparties. In the second case, the uninformed holders of ex-
posures face the ‘seller’s curse’ (of being exposed to ‘cherry picking’) when selling to more informed
counterparties.
21For a more formal analysis together with proofs of the propositions discussed in this paper, see
Biffis and Blake (2010a, 2013).
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format would appear a natural solution, given the familiarity of investors in ILSs with
catastrophe bonds with payoﬀs linked to indices or parametric triggers.
It so happens that the principal-at-risk format was precisely the format chosen by
Swiss Re when it issued its Vita bonds22 to hedge the extreme mortality risk it was
hedging. A similar format was adopted for Kortis by Swiss Re in 2010. Indexed on
England & Wales and US population, Kortis was the ﬁrst ever longevity trend bond:
it would reduce payments to investors in the case of a large divergence between the
mortality improvements experienced by male lives aged 75 − 85 in England & Wales
and by male lives aged 55− 65 in the US. So we have very successful precedents in the
form of mortality/longevity trend bonds that should help promote an equally successful
capital market in longevity risk transfers.
Figure 4: The market for longevity risk transfers.
22See “Swiss Re transfers 180 million of extreme mortality risk” (accessed 1 July 2012).
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